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I. Introduction to Pensions and the PBGC

The retirement-income system in the average American household can be described
as a three-legged combination of private and government savings. The first leg includes
Social Security and other government welfare programs designed for the elderly. The
second is individual savings. This leg includes IRA's, savings accounts and stock and bond
portfolios, among other things. The final leg includes Privately-sponsored pension plans
(Schmitt, 1993). In simplest terms, there exist two types of pension plans in the United
States: defined-contribution and defined-benefit. For general information -- as well as later
discussion -- we will now define both.
A defined-contribution plan offers a combination of employee and employer-funded
savings. The plan sponsor 1 sets up the plan and guarantees a specified contribution to each
employee's individual fund. This contribution is usually either a percentage of salary or a
capped match of employee contributions. The amount and requirements can change
depending on years of service and other factors. The employee is then able to invest those
funds in a variety of ways. Usually the company offers a number of stock funds, bond funds
and money market accounts. The monthly benefit upon retirement is therefore based on the
contributions and investment returns of the individual employee. All of the money in the
fund at retirement is used to buy an annuity for the employee to pay the employee and

lIhe plan sponsor is the company that initiates or offers the pension to its employees.
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spouse until they die. 2
A defined-benefit plan differs in that it guarantees a specific amount to be paid each
month at retirement. The amount is easily calculated using a formula based on years of
service and salary. A sample defined-benefit plan would pay 1.5% of the employees final
salary for every year of service. Therefore an employee who served 40 years with a
company and had a salary of $50,000 in his final year would get 60% of $50,000. This
equates to $30,000 a year or $2,500 a month until death. 3 The difficulty with these plans
comes in funding these future benefits. The plan sponsor is entirely responsible for funding
these obligations. The company therefore must predict the actuarial present value of future
obligations in order to keep the plan able to pay benefits as they come due.
Before we discuss further the differences in these plans, we must be able to
differentiate between the pension plan and the pension fund. The pension plan in both cases
is the agreement or contract between the company and employee to provide for retirement
savings. It consists of the investment, qualification and contribution details. The pension
fund is the asset pool used to back these guarantees. For defined-contribution plans, this
fund consists of a separate account for each employee. For defined-benefit plans, all funds
are lumped together and dispersed as employees retire. The defined-benefit pension fund,
unlike the individual accounts in a defined-contribution plan, can have different levels or
classifications of funding. If no funds exist, the plan is unfunded. If a fund has asset values
less than the calculated liabilities, the plan is underfunded. If assets and liabilities are -

2Some companies will offer an income floor on defmed-contribution plans to provide against retiring with no
income, but it is usually very small and not an incentive to risk money unwisely.

3ERISA (the bill that formed the PBGC in 1974) also provided provisions for the spouse. When the wageamer
dies, the spouse is entitled to 50% of the monthly benefit until they also die.
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theoretically -- exactly equivalent, the plan is fully-funded. Should assets be greater than
liabilities, the plan is considered overfunded. 4 This difference in makeup of the pension plan
and fund equates to different risks. One of these is default risk. Default risk is the risk, to
the employee, that the plan will not have enough funds, upon his retirement, to pay vested
benefits. Vested benefits are those that employee has earned through his tenure that are
guaranteed by plan specifications at normal retirement age. S Default risk only exists in
defined-benefit plans. As stated, defined-contribution plans guarantee only specified
contributions by the sponsor, not the benefits upon retirement. Therefore, as long as those
contributions are made, the plan sponsor has fulfilled its obligations. With a defined-benefit
plan, however, the sponsor is responsible for making sufficient contributions to pay a
defined amount in the future. If the company estimates future obligations incorrectly or
insufficiently funds the plan, the employees could lose a portion of their pensions.
Therefore, companies must incorporate into the pension plan some sort of hedge against
this risk. There are three ways to do this. The first is to keep the plan fully funded and
backed by a guaranteed right of retirees to a sufficient portion of company net worth. The
second is to privately insure the fund and employees against default risk. 6 The final way of
defending against default risk is a government guarantee. Enter the PBGC.
The PBGC (pension Benefit Guarantee Corporation) was established in 1974 under
Title IV of The Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA). Its purpose was to
provide pension plan termination insurance for all private defined-benefit pension plans.

"Plans that are overfimded will generally be referred to as fully-funded, including throughout the rest of this paper.
~y companies delay vesting until the employee has been employed for a designated period of time, say one year.
6At

present, very few if any insurance companies write pension fund insurance, especially for larger plans.
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The PBGC is a self-financed government agency. This means all operations and costs are
to be covered by premium income, investment income and funds seized from terminated
plans. Originally, premiums were set at $1 per participant per year. Provisions were made
for increases in this amount, but only as a flat-rate increase. Since then, a risk-adjusted
premium structure has been allowed. Present premiums are $19 per participating employee
plus $9 per $1000 of underfunding, with a cap of $72 per participant per year. The general
policies and regulations of the PBGC are governed by a committee functioning under the
Department of Labor and chaired by the Secretary of Labor. This oversight committee also
includes the Secretaries of Commerce and the Treasury. The everyday operations and
direction of the PBGC are left to the Corporation's Executive Secretary who, along with
the other 500 or so employees, is appointed in the same manner as all other civil servants.
The oversight committee and Director receive assistance and consultation from an advisory
committee. These committee members are appointed by the President and serve staggered
terms. Their main function, though they may advise on any area, is to provide guidance on
general policy and the investment of Corporation funds.
The PBGC, as previously stated, requires that all qualified private defined-benefit
pension plans pay for PBGC coverage. Qualification is determined by IRS and based on the
design of the plan. Once a plan is deemed qualified, all benefits that accrue while the plan is
qualified are covered, even if the plan later loses its status. Benefits that accrue after the
plan loses qualification, however, are not. The following is a list of groups ineligible for
coverage as detailed in ERISA: individual, religious, fraternal or government plans, plans
established for nonresident aliens or higWy paid employees only, or groups established
solely for the purpose of pension coverage. These exceptions were put into place to
5

prevent moral hazard and overutilization. Consider a defined-benefit plan formed by ten
wealthy investment brokers solely for the purpose of additional retirement income. The
plan is designed to give them all $50,000 a year from age 65 until death. Each contributes
to the pension fund enough to cover their calculated future liabilities. Therefore, at the
inception of the plan, it is fully-funded and covered by the PBGC. They then take that
pension fund and throw it into a 'go for broke' type of investment. Should the investment
prosper, they have gained significant income for future luxuries. Should the investments
fail, they are guaranteed to get back what they invested by the PBGC. This 'gambling
insurance' was not in ERISA's intentions. The exceptions were put into place to protect the
integrity of the PBGC's mission. It was not formed to help special interest groups increase
their retirement income. Rather, ERISA was put forth to help provide protection for the
American worker should a pension disaster occur.
Upon termination ofa covered plan, the PBGC assumes control of the plan and its
funds. Once the PBGC has assumed control of a fund, the corporate sponsor is still
responsible for 100% vesting. With respect to the enforcement of this responsibility, the
inability of a plan sponsor to satisfy these obligations could result in the plan being
retroactively terminated. This equates to major tax implication for the company, as plan
contributions are tax deductible.
The PBGC covers both single-employer and multi-employer plans. In 1995, single
employer plans made up more than 96% of both premium dollars and gross plan numbers.
Therefore, our scope will be limited to single-employer plans, with all references to numbers
or values of pension plans under the PBGC presented as such.
ERISA also set out specific guidelines as to types of terminations. They are partial
6

tennination, discontinuance and suspension/curtailment. A partial termination occurs when
coverage ceases for only a portion of covered participants for reason of plan alteration,
changes in group eligibility classifications, or a plant shutdown or layoff In such a case, the
PBGC rules regarding tennination apply only to those areas tenninated or removed. Any
time contributions cease and benefit responsibility is turned over to the PBGC, the plan is
considered completely discontinued or tenninated. A temporary cessation of employer
contribution constitutes a 'contribution suspension'. In this case, current benefits are not
stopped. Similarly, if contributions cease and employees are refunded, the PBGC will
categorize the plan 'curtailed'.
When tennination occurs, a chain of events follows. First, the net assets of the plan
are disbursed to those areas covered, according to priority. Priority is as follows: voluntary
employee contributions, required employee contributions, benefits to those who have
already received benefits for at least three years under provisions of the plan that have been
in place for at least five years, any other vested benefits, and non-vested benefits.
Therefore, if a plan is tenninated with sufficient funds, all benefits are paid in full and on
time. Should a plan tenninate underfunded, the funds are then disbursed according to
priority. When the plan's net assets are depleted, the next step is a lien on the company's
net worth. Under original ERISA provisions, The PBGC had claim to only 30% of a
company's net worth. The Omnibus Budget Reform Act of 1987 (OBRA) removed this
30% limit. This net worth is based on the operating value of the company up to 120 days
prior to tennination. Any unfunded liabilities the PBGC cannot recover from net worth
become claims on the assets of the PBGC, much like an insurance claim. These claims
would be funded by the premiums and investment income of the PBGC.
7

One in flaw the original provisions of ERISA was in defining the insured event. In
the simplest sense, the event insured under ERISA was a plan termination. This created
two problems. First, until 1986, when the Single-Employer Pension Plan Amendment Act
(SEPPAA) was passed, a sponsor could terminate a plan for any reason, as long as the
PBGC was notified at least 10 days in advance. Therefore, the determination of when the
PBGC would take over the responsibility of a pension benefit was left, for the most part, up
to the plan sponsor -- hardly an unbiased party. Secondly the plan's regulations gave the
sponsors an incentive to terminate plans coupled with a disincentive to keep them fully
funded. A company could ensure itself relief of a portion of liabilities should future disaster
occur by keeping the plan inadequately funded. Furthennore, a company in tunnoil could
terminate a plan for the sole purpose of decreasing liabilities, leaving The PBGC a mess to
clean up. In fact, many companies did just that until SEPPAA in 1986.
SEPPAA put forth two types of allowable terminations: standard and distress. A
standard termination is one where the assets of the plan are enough to cover all vested
benefits, thereby leaving no burden of support on the PBGC. If the plan is not fully
funded, it cannot terminate unless deemed by the PBGC to be in 'Distress'. In order for a
company to terminate under Distress classification, at least one of the four following criteria
must be met:
1. A petition for liquidation of the fund sponsor has been filed under US
bankruptcy laws,
2. The plan sponsor is reorganizing company structure according to bankruptcy
law regulation, has been deemed temporarily unable to payoff its debts or
continue business and the termination has been court approved,
8

3. The PBGC deems the company unable to continue business unless the plan is
terminated, or
4. The PBGC feels the costs of the fund to the company have become unreasonable
through no fault of the company or its management.
This allowed much more regulation by The PBGC as far as plan termination. The
PBGC could now, for companies in trouble, allow them to 'freeze' plans. No new benefits
would be accrued, but the company or sponsor was still obliged to fund the remaining
liabilities of the plans vested benefits. Such an action would limit the spread of the
underfunding problem.

9

II. Problems with The PBGC

The net position of the PBGC is based on the difference between assets and
liabilities. The graph below shows the net position of the PBGC for the last ten years, in
millions of dollars.

Net Position of the PBGC
1986 -1995
(in millions)
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Before we discuss the implications of 10 years of loss, we will first examine the
assumptions made in determining the net position. Because the PBGC only includes already
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terminated plans in terms ofliabilities, this net position measurement is flawed. It makes the
assumption that there will be no terminations in the future. In 1995, the net position of the
PBGC was negative $315 million. This means that if the PBGC were discontinued at year
end 1995, it would be $315 million short of covering the benefits due for plans in its
control. Any plans terminated in 1996 have been ignored.
As of the end of December 1994, the total underfunding among PBGC insured plans
was $31 billion. Not to be misleading, this is the total shortfall of all covered plans, not just
plans under PBGC control. This does not take into consideration the improvement of the
plan or the probability of the sponsor terminating the plan. Only a few of these plans will
terminate. The PBGC should however, take into consideration these potential liabilities
when reporting net position, which will be lower as more plans terminate.
All ofthese numbers can be misleading. The actual amount of underfunding and
therefore the present value of the PBGC guarantees can vary depending on what
assumptions are made. Pension liabilities are based on the present value of future liabilities
and are affected by changes in employee characteristics and economic conditions. All of
these components are difficult to predict accurately and leave room for interpretation.
How to measure the underfunding of a plan fund is a problem the PBGC has approached,
but not solved. The table below shows in very simplified terms the effect of minute
assumption changes in the funding of a plan.
Interest Rate Amount needed in 2026 Amount needed in 1996
4.50%

$1,000000

$267000

5.00%

$1,000,000

$231 377

Change:

13%
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This plan will need $1 million dollars to pay benefits in 30 years. How much do
they need in the fund in 1996? That depends on what you assume the interest rate will do.
An assumption change ofjust half of a percentage point causes a change of 13% in the
funding requirements of the plan'. For a multi-million dollar plan, this equates to a major
difference. Interest rates are not the only problem. There are other questions fund
managers must ask themselves in order to fund for future liabilities.
•

How long will employees stay with the company?

•

When will they retire?

•

How much will they be making at retirement?

•

When will they die?
Different fund managers and actuaries will assume different answers to these

questions. It is these discrepancies that cause a problem for the PBGC.
Another problem facing the PBGC is one of demographics. As baby boomers near
retirement age we will see a mass exodus from the workplace which could prove that many
seemingly strong plans are underfunded. Plans that are slightly underfunded can manage by
using contributions meant for present employees to pay retirees, much like the operation of
the Social Security System. When a large number of baby boomers leave, this will no
longer work. What is causing our recent Social Security debate will also affect the PBGC.
If this happens and a number of plans terminate, the PBGC will become liable for
obligations it cannot fulfill.

1The difference changes depending on the maturity date of the liability. I have chosen 30 years simply to illustrate
the changes. Liabilities can range sometimes from I to 50 years, but again I wanted to simplify the example.
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The next group of the PBGC problems are best discussed in comparison with the
FSLIC (Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation). The downfall of the FSLIC can
be attributed in the most part to poor regulation and operation and mismanagement of
resources. The following similarities suggest the same could happen to the PBGC.
The similarities include:
•

Inconsistencies between stated goals and implicitly evident objectives,

•

Operations incongruous with effectual operations,

•

Failure or difficulty in determining true and accurate financial data,

•

Attribution of losses to human error or 'freak' occurrences,

•

Tendency to allow problems to grow for too long before reacting, and

•

Conflicts of interest between government agencies involved.

GOAL INCONSISTENCIES
The objectives of the PBGC are put forth in ERISA. To quote from former
Executive Director James B. Lockhart, III in response to a 1993 paper by Zvi Bodie and
Robert C. Merton, "The PBGC's missions, as spelled out in ERISA, are to encourage the
growth of private pension plans, ... to ensure the timely payment of benefits, and to keep
[PBGC] premiums at the lowest possible level." (Schmitt, 1993) Many critics, however,
have pointed out fairly clear indications of other intents. One such attempt is the use of the
PBGC as a boost for struggling industries and companies. A guarantee of benefits
combined with a capped premium structure renders the government as a tool of
subsidization. Cyclical industries are the most likely to fallon hard times. These industries
-- usually manufacturing -- are dependant upon blue-collar labor, who in tum are the most
13

likely to have defined-benefit plans rather than defined-contribution. Companies are able to
use the PBGC guarantees to stay afloat during down years by promising unions higher
pension benefits. By not funding these promises, the company has transferred a portion of
potential liabilities to the PBGC. This transfer is subsidized by companies who have neither
reason nor desire to do so amounting to a put option. Companies are able to 'sell' these
huge negative assets to the government for the price of the PBGC premiums.

OPERATIONS
As stated previously, the main goal of the PBGC is to provide private pension
holders with a fair and effective means of protection against default risk. To do so, the
PBGC must utilize some combination of three regulatory principles. These three principles
are:
1. Efficient premiums based on the risk imposed on the pool,
2. Regulation of the investment of fund assets,
3. Monitoring of funding and operations.(Schmitt, 1993)
The omission of any of these three can result in the guarantor failing to fulfill its
promises. We will examine each separately.
The flat-rate premiums originally set forth in ERISA guaranteed subsidization
among good and bad risks. This was recognized and changed. The new risk-based
premiums are still a step short of efficient. First of all, the existence of a cap still provides
areas of subsidization. Severely underfunded plans that have hit the cap are then subsidized
for the excess by more healthy plans. In addition, the PBGC premiums do not take into
account the firm's non-fund assets which back the fund assets. Should a plan terminate, the
14

PBGC has priority claim on at least 30% of a company's net worth. A financially strong
company with $1 million underfunding would therefore pose much less a risk than a
struggling company with the same pension shortfall. Under present structure, however,
both are charged the same. This subsidization could be -- in part -- a reason for the shift
away from defined-benefit plans. Healthy defined-benefit plans that are tired of
subsidization and feel no need for default risk insurance are still required by law to have it.
The only way to get out is to change the plan to a defined-contribution or other format.
Consider a person who invests wisely and hedges any major risks he takes. If he were
required to subsidize other private investors in the form of government insurance of only his
stock investments, and no other investments, he would more than likely look into bond
funds or other options. Even ifhe felt stocks would perform better, who wants to assume
the risks and costs of another? He would feel rightly cheated at being 'punished' for wise
investment and choose alternative methods. So have strong defined-benefit plan sponsors,
leaving the PBGC with a weakening pool. This is adverse selection.
The PBGC must also regulate the investment of pension funds. Let us say a
particular company with a fully-funded PBGC guaranteed pension plan is having a bad
year. Management may feel that putting capital into the pension fund is impossible. To
make up the needed increase in funding they may choose to increase expected returns by
investing in riskier markets. If these gambles payoff, the plan stays fully-funded. Ifit falls
flat, the PBGC can assume the liabilities. Therefore we have a moral hazard problem for
the PBGC. Either way, they have kept more capital for operations. To prevent such an
occurrence, the PBGC must regulate the allowable investment options for portions of
pension funds.
15

Monitoring follows much the same logic. A plan that is strong can only stay strong
through continued funding. The PBGC cannot assume plans are good until they are not.
That is like not hitting the brakes until you hit the stopped car ahead. By then, it's too late.

DATA INACCURACIES
As far as the inaccuracies of reported data, the PBGC cannot be held to blame for
the lack of high-quality modeling and estimation techniques, as discussed earlier. A
problem without blame, however, is a problem all the same. By not being able to predict
accurately a pension plan's future assets or liabilities, the PBGC has no way of guaranteeing
its own comfortable operating cushion without excessive premiums. In a later section we
see the PBGC arguing against loosened restrictions on pension fund withdrawals. They
state that, due to the volatility of pension fund balance sheets, a seemingly fully-funded plan
can go broke in the blink of an eye. So could the PBGC -- with a difference. If a pension'
terminates underfunded, the PBGC covers it. If the PBGC terminates underfunded, the
difference will be absorbed by the taxpayers.

BLAME AND SLOW ACTION
Just as PBGC officials could take a lesson from private insurers as far as premium
structure, so could they in the case of blame for losses. Attributing poor years to freak
occurrences or human error is a cardinal sin in the insurance industry. It is the job of an
insurer to predict big losses and plan for even bigger ones. Insurers need to prevent
problems before they occur rather than react once they materialize. Both the FSLIC and
16

the PBGC were and are guilty of waiting too long to step into a dangerous situation.
Though they may intend to be gentle and allow as much chance as possible for recovery, the
resulting subsidization by healthy plans is unfair. The guarantee is meant to help all plans,
not just poor ones. The PBGC has a stated goal of keeping premiums as low as possible,
right along side maintaining a healthy pension system. It seems in practice that this goal has
taken a back seat.

CONFLICTS OF INTEREST
The final area of comparison between the failed FSLIC and the PBGC involves
conflicts of interest. As seen in the overview of PBGC operations, several government
agencies take part in the functioning of the PBGC, including Congress, the President, the
courts and the IRS. By the design of the Constitution, each area of government functions
to balance out one another. This checks-and-balances system, however admirable, can
wreak havoc on the PBGC's micro-level management. At no time was this more evident
than in the debates concerning legislative tax and spending changes of 1995. A difference
of opinion arose between the IRS and the PBGC. The IRS sets the funding standards for
pensions, the PBGC regulates them. Unfortunately, the IRS also takes in tax revenue. The
arguments were a result of a Congressional bill allowing companies to withdraw funds from
pensions that are at least 125% funded without the 50% PBGC penalty previously assessed.
The PBGC was obviously opposed because plans were losing funding and therefore at
greater risk of default. The IRS was in favor because the company would now pay a
corporate income tax, resulting in more tax revenue for them. To have two of the agencies
controlling pension guarantees in direct conflict does not allow for efficient operations or
17

management.
Another problem arose in 1987 with the enactment ofOBRA. The Act included
tougher regulations of maximum funding standards. This came as a result of the IRS
complaint that companies were hiding too much money, tax-deferred, in pension funds.
Overfunding, however, is not a problem the PBGC wants solved.
The PBGC has also had trouble with the American court system. Despite OBRA's
lift of the 30% limit on PBGC claim to net assets at bankruptcy, the courts ultimately decide
who gets the money. In recent years, the PBGC has had trouble getting even the 30%
guaranteed in ERISA. Legislation to improve the operations of the PBGC will do no good
if other areas of the government do not recognize and uphold those changes.
The combination of all the similarities allow for a valid questioning of PBGC
operations. The bailout ofFSLIC can serve no good purpose but to prevent a similar
fiasco.

18

III. Improvement Suggestion - Premiums

As we stated earlier, management of default guarantees requires a combination of
premiums, fund regulation and monitoring. We will focus our improvement suggestions on
premiums, as other improvements have been offered previously.
Premiums are now set at $19 per plan participant, plus $9 per $1000 of
underfunding, capped at $72 per participant. Though better than the previous flat-rate, it is
a risk-adjusted, not risk-based rate, meaning there is still a significant discrepancy between
the premium charged and the risk presented to the PBGC. Two interesting solutions have
been advanced and merit discussion. 8 The first is from Jack VanDerhei from The Journal of
Risk and Insurance, June 1990. In his paper, "An Empirical Analysis of Risk-Related
Insurance Premiums of the PBGC," he suggests a more private-style approach to premium
structure. In simplest terms, the premium charged would be a combination of probability
and severity, based on OBRA definitions and fund liability.
The second is from Bodie and Merton's "Pension Benefit Guarantees: A Functional
Analysis." They suggest premiums based on 'percent immunization'. The liabilities of a
pension fund are fixed-level annuities. Investment in default-free bond income securities
would therefore effectively hedge these guarantees. Say a plan, for simplicity's sake, has
one employee who gets 1.5% of salary for each year employed. The plan would be fully
immunized by purchasing zero-coupon bonds each year to mature sequentially after
retirement for the 1.5% amount, based on expected retirement age and death. Though this

llMany others have been published, but again we must limit our focus.
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model could be flawed if the employee lives to 100, if calculated using mortality tables on a
large scale, the risk would essentially be zero. The Bodie and Merton plan would have
premiums based on the percentage of liabilities immunized and the percentage of
underfunding. The two would be combined into a fonnula to produce premiums calculated
as a percentage of present-valued guaranteed benefits, rather than on a per-participant basis,
with no cap.
Both of these plans have flaws. The VanDerhei plan fails to recognize that the
PBGC, unlike private insurers, cannot choose its risks. Any plan that meets IRS
qualification is automatically covered, and coverage cannot easily be terminated. The Bodie
and Merton plan allows too much credit for net worth. Even though the assets of a plan are
backed by net worth, the PBGC has no regulatory control over general operations. It
cannot monitor those funds or their investment in the same way it can with pension assets.
Both plans do, however, offer excellent improvement suggestions and show even more
clearly the need for a structural change in the PBGC's premiums.

20

IV. A Solution: Abolish the PBGC

With any organization, government or otherwise, there exists a period of refonns
and improvements in the years after inception. The PBGC is no different. The PBGC has
made several changes to the original ERISA guidelines. SEPPAA and OBRA -- mentioned
earlier -- and the RPA (Retirement Protection Act) -- mentioned later -- are all examples. I
feel, however, after my research into the Corporation and its operations, that all refonns
skirt the inherent flaws of the PBGC. Due to its design and function, the PBGC distorts
behavior and has been ineffective from a cost analysis basis. For these reasons, to be
discussed herein, I feel the best solution to the problems discussed in this paper is to abolish
thePBGC.
We start the argument with an analysis of the PBGC's behavior distortion in the
American economy. Previously discussed were the large amounts ofunderfunding that
accrue in American defined-benefit pensions. Advocates of the PBGC will point this out as
a problem the government must address. We cannot allow the average worker to lose
vested benefits after 40 years of devoted service should the pension fund falter. I agree, but
I also feel it is the PBGC which has helped to cause this problem.
A large percentage of defined-benefit guarantees covered by the PBGC is in high
fixed-cost industries. Many of these are also the most cyclical industries. The management
of these companies must cut cost in down years. How do they do this? The main variable
expense for these industries is their blue-collar labor. In order to survive these cyclical
downturns, they can use the government, via their defined-benefit pension plans and the
PBGC. They keep labor happy during these times by promising more pension benefits
21

rather than increased wages. Then, by delaying the funding until better financial times, the
company has effectively reduced operation costs without reducing operations.
If labor unions are supposed to protect workers against these sorts of empty
promises, why then do they allow companies this leeway? The PBGC. Should the plan fail,
they know the government will indemnify their pension holders. If the PBGC did not exist,
unions would be much stricter in demanding companies back increased promises with
increased funding. They would also never let companies get as far in the hole as they are
now. The supply and demand curve below illustrates what would happen to the labor
market should the PBGC guarantees no longer be in effect.
Price
(Wages)

Equilibrium Price
without PBGC

1

w/PBGC

Risk
Premium

Equihl

Price

withPBGC

Dw/PBGC

Quantity
(# of employees)
The removal of the PBGC would cause a shift in both the supply and demand
curves. The supply curve would shift back because, ceterus paribus, fewer people would be
willing to work, for the same wage, for a company with a severely underfunded pension
were it not covered by the PBGe. The demand curve would shift because of an increase in
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the marginal net revenue product. 9 Removal of the PBGC also removes their premiums.
For individual companies, these curves will differ (See Supply and Demand Comparisons,
page 33). Those with fully-funded pension plans will have less of a shift in supply as their
safe pension plan will not cause as great a worker demand for wage increases. Their
demand curve will shift further, as the PBGC is a greater cost to those companies that keep
their plans fully-funded. For severely underfunded plans, the opposite occurs. Supply shifts
further as workers want to be compensated for the significant risk of pension default.
Demand will shift less because the money they save on premiums is offset by the value of
the PBGC 'put option' we mentioned earlier. They purchase the ability to shift massive
liabilities to the PBGC for the cost of capped premiums; a great value to underfunded plans.
The difference in the equilibrium price with and without the PBGC for any company
equates to a risk premium. It is the extra wages companies with underfunded plans would
have to pay for the shift in pension default risk from the government to the employees.
Our supply and demand curve shows that the very existence of the PBGC distorts
behavior. Companies that would normally be forced to fund all pension promises have been
able to get away with massive underfunding due to PBGC guarantees, as well as enjoy
lower labor costs.
We will now examine the abolition of the PBGC from a costlbenefit perspective. In
order to justify removing the government guarantee, we must show that the costs of the
coverage outweigh the benefits. The PBGC generally has two sorts of costs. The first are
the operational costs; $138 million in 1995. These cost are covered by the premium income
from PBGC covered plans. One flaw is that since PBGC coverage is mandatory, these

9The MNRP = (marginal product)x(marginal revenue - PBGe premium costs)
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costs equate to a tax on companies involved. But it can be easily argued that $138 million
is hardly enough to warrant removal of pension guarantees. Let us then tum to the PBGC's
second cost; terminations.
In 1995, the total underfunding of all PBGC-covered plans was $31 billion. In
1994; $71 billion. These numbers represent the total possible liabilities of the PBGC. If all
plans were to have terminated at year end 1995, the PBGC would have been responsible
for $31 billion in pension promises. To cover this, they had total net worth of negative
$315 million. Now it is ridiculous to assume all plans will terminate at any time. It is not
ridiculous, however, to think that a significant portion could. Let us briefly examine what
portion of the $31 billion could become government liabilities.
Almost 50% of the 1995 underfunding was found in the steel, navigational /
aeronautical instrument, transportation equipment, airline and automobile industries,
according to the PBGC's 1995 annual report. All cyclical industries, these pose the greatest
threat to the PBGC. As explained earlier, should we experience a major economic
downturn, all of these industries could falter, and their pension plans would follow.
Let us now examine underfunding from a different perspective. One cause of the
$40 billion improvement in pension underfunding from 1994 to 1995 could also aide in the
downfall of the PBGC. There are two main reason for this drastic one year improvement.
The passage of the Retirement Protection Act (RPA) in late 1994 increased funding
requirements for numerous severely underfunded plans. The most significant cause,
however, was the rising interest rate. Although assets may have fallen, liabilities fell even
more. As seen in our example of interest rate changes earlier, as the interest rate rises, the
present value of future liabilities falls. This dropped the liabilities of plans significantly.
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Therefore, a company that did nothing to increase funding would still look better from a net
position standpoint. How is this a dilemma? We look at the performance of the PBGC
over the same period of time. Investment income was over $2 billion in 1995, a 579%
increase over the $400 million investment loss in 1994. Herein lies the problem.
The PBGC has steadily increased its percentage of investment in the stock market.
It has done so on the debatable belief that, in the long run, stocks will outperform all other

investments and increase the PBGC's ability to cover a large termination year. This has
resulted in an asset / liability mismatch that I put forth as the final reason for PBGC
removal.
Pension fund managers have certain guidelines they follow for investment. They
want to make as much money as possible without putting the fund at any significant risk.
Most have found the best way to do so is a mix of both bonds and stocks, usually at a 2: 1
ratio. The PBGC has done the same. Last year, the PBGC's asset mix was 30% equity and
70% fixed income securities. 10 They have been increasing the equity portion in the hopes of
increasing returns. This was a reaction by the PBGC to the increasingly clear danger of
terminations exceeding PBGC funds.
This theory works well in strong economic years, like 1995. Unfortunately, by
looking at 1994, we can see that the effects of a slower year can be disastrous. In 1994, the
total underfunding reached a record high of$71 billion. This was coupled with over $400
million in investment losses. Should the economy experience an extended slump, the
ramifications for the PBGC could be a collapse. This would lead to a taxpayer bailout of
FSLIC proportions.

l~eal

Estate and other investments make up less than 2% of investments, and have been ignored.

25

Insurance companies must operate so as always to maintain the ability to cover
potential liabilities. If they cannot, they themselves are in need of insurance and are not
serving their purpose. To do this, they must match their assets and liabilities effectively. At
present, the PBGC is not doing so. In a good year, the assets of the PBGC will rise and
liabilities will fall, creating a false sense of security. In a bad year, assets will fall and
liabilities rise (as pension assets decline in value), creating a crisis situation.
The PBGC has shown through its first 20 years that it cannot hold an operating
cushion; it never has. This trend towards equity markets to increase revenue is an indication
that the PBGC is realizing it can never operate effectively. In order to have enough money
to cover liabilities, the PBGC has two options. The first is to charge fair premiums. The
second is to use stronger plans to subsidize weaker ones. To charge a fair premium, the
companies who pose the greatest risk must pay the higher-end premiums. The problem is
that these plans are severely underfunded usually because they cannot afford to make
adequate contributions. How then could they afford to pay the highest premiums? They
cannot. The PBGC has realized this and attempts to use stronger plans to subsidize weaker
ones. That is why this is a government safety-net tool rather than government insurance
tool. The problem with this approach is that the strong plans do not want to subsidize.
Unlike Social Security or other welfare programs, participants can leave the system. By
switching to a defined-contribution plan, thy are no longer forced to carry PBGC coverage.
This has happened and the PBGC is carrying more and more underfunded plans with fewer
and fewer strong plans to subsidize them; adverse selection. As with any welfare or safety
net program, the only way to catch everything is to keep the net wide. There will always
exist flaws and loopholes because removing them would ultimately hurt the ones for whom
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the program is designed.
As we say that the costs of the PBGC are too much, are they sufficient to make up
for the loss of pension benefit guarantees? Ensuring that American defined-benefit pension
holders will get their vested retirement income is a valuable benefit.
As stated earlier, there are three ways to cover pension default risk: keeping the
plan fully-funded and backed, insuring privately, and insuring through the government. If
we remove the PBGC, how then to we replace its function? Private insurance is
unavailable. Insurers cannot efficiently insure pension default risk for two reasons. First of
all, all risks are correlated. As we have shown, a poor economic year would hurt all
pension fund assets. It is operationally unwise to insure numerous large policies with
correlated risks. The second is that an insurer would need numerous plans to diversify the
individual risks of each. There would be no way to start a program with less than 50 plans.
Such a large pool of multi-million dollar risks would result in an additional $10-20 billion
dollar liability pool. No insurer will take that chance. We are therefore left with the need
to keep pension plans fully-funded without the PBGC.
In theory, companies would want to keep pensions fully-funded, otherwise
employees would demand higher wages or go to a company with a better plan, as shown
earlier in the supply and demand curve. In practice, this is very difficult. The average
American has neither the knowledge nor the information to judge pension strength. Even
labor unions and other worker's associations would have a difficult time with it. To this end
I suggest the PSAC, Pension Security Assessment Council. Consisting of a staff of three or
four pension experts and a few assistants, the PSAC would serve the same function as the
PBGC, but without the guarantee. It could monitor and regulate pension plans on the basis
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of funding and operations. It could then add to its duties a ranking of all plans. This
ranking, similar to a Best's ranking of insurance companies, could be made mandatorily
available to all prospective employees. Under this scenario, pension plans could still be
regulated. Labor unions and employees would have a credible source for pension
information as well. And most importantly, the government -- and taxpayers -- would not
be responsible for unfunded liabilities.
The very existence of the PBGC causes moral hazard and distorted behavior.
Because of the PBGC guarantees, companies have a disincentive to keep pension plans
fully-funded. As our supply and demand curve shows, the PBGC causes companies to act
in ways other than what the market would normally dictate. Why not take advantage of an
opportunity to delay costs? The PBGC gives companies the ability to wait for improved
financial performance before funding for future liabilities. Funding pensions results in too
much of an opportunity cost. Companies would be better off to invest the money and
continually delay contributions. The use of the PBGC to indemnify the default risk of
defined-benefit pension holder causes more problems than it solves. We then combine that
with other problems. Adverse selection is occurring due to the lack of an effective risk
adjusted premium. As all the strong companies leave the PBGC pool, the overall default
risk to the PBGC grows. We also have the asset / liability mismatch of the PBGC. A major
recession could cause numerous pension failures, lower the assets of the PBGC, and result
in yet another taxpayer bailout of a federal insurance corporation. The PBGC is not
operating as an efficient insurer of pension default risk. In addition, they are distorting the
behavior of their insureds and placing the risk ofPBGC default on taxpayers. It is for these
reasons that I suggest the abolition of the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation.
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v.

An Alternative Solution -- PBGC Changes

As an alternative solution to the removal of the PBGC guarantees, there are changes
which could be made to remove its fundamental flaws. The problems that need the most
attention are the adverse selection and moral hazard that have caused a behavioral distortion
of the companies involved, as well as the asset / liability mismatch of the PBGC itself For
reference sake, adverse selection is the insurance of high risks at an unprofitable premium
rate. In our case it refers to the PBGC being forced to insure plans that in a private market
would be uninsurable. Moral hazard is the risk to the insurer of losses due to an insured's
intentional misuse of the coverage. It is the risk that an insured will act differently because
he knows he is covered in the event of a loss.
To reduce the adverse selection problem, you must make PBGC insurance cost
effective for fully-funded plans as well as underfunded plans. This can best be done by a
change in premium structure. As it stands now, the premiums of the PBGC allow for too
much subsidization among plans. My premium suggestion contains two components,
assessing both the probability and severity of a loss (termination). In order to calculate the
probability rating, three characteristics would need to be considered: the stability or strength
of the industry, the historical and recent performance trends of the company, and the
stability of the fund (based on the asset makeup). In order to measure the potential severity
or magnitude of a termination, the PBGC would need to analyze the amount of
underfunding, the number of covered employees, the growth of the employee base, and
potential additions to the plan in terms of benefits. The premium amount would be based
on a per dollar of guaranteed benefits basis rather than per person basis. The combination
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of these two components would result in a much more risk-based premium than present.
There would, however, need to be a cap. Although it reduces the effectiveness of this
structure, it is necessary. Because this is a required government insurance program, the
PBGC cannot charge struggling companies premiums so excessive that the company must
go out of business or give up their plan. The PBGC does not want to eliminate private
pension plans, but rather they want to keep pension plans strong. This cap would cause
subsidization, but the intention is to keep premiums low enough that the benefits of pension
coverage (and the costs of restructuring), even for fully-funded plans, are greater than the
costs of the subsidization.
To combat the moral hazard problem is more difficult. Moral hazard exists here
because the PBGC can neither choose its risks nor remove them if they lose funding.
Therefore, the PBGC must develop some sort of disincentive to terminate. My suggestion
is to grant the PBGC the right to retroactively 'uninsure' pension promises that are made
and then not funded. Do not allow companies to make empty promises. Immediately
following these changes, all pension benefits that are funded are covered. All those that are
not have no coverage until they are. Once a portion of liabilities is funded, they are covered
for their duration, provided the company does not remove fund assets. As new liabilities
accrue, they too must be funded or they are not covered. The purpose of the PBGC is to
cover companies in the event of a pension disaster. This does not include planned
underfunding or delayed contributions. It is the responsibility of the company, not the
PBGC, to compensate or fund employee pensions. By eliminating the guarantees of
unfunded liabilities, the PBGC would then have the force oflabor unions to help funding.
A union would no longer accept pension increases in place of wage increases of they felt the
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company could not fund them. In addition, the unions would have legal cause to go after
companies should they not fund the promised benefits. Non-union workers would be forced
to rely solely on the information they get from the PBGC. For this reason, all employees
would get notices if their pensions were not covered. From there it is up to the employee to
decide what to do about the transfer of default risk. The PBGC could notify employees as
they do now, which would allow for greater decision making power on the part of
employees and their organizations.
These two changes would reduce the behavioral distortion we saw in the supply and
demand curves. The ability to retroactively remove pension guarantees on unfunded
benefits would help keep the equilibrium price where it would be without the PBGC. The
demand curve would still be shifted due to the premiums, but not as much for fully-funded
plans. The supply curve would be less shifted as companies would still need to pay more if
their plan were underfunded.
The main problem with these suggestions is that the PBGC will no longer be
covering all pension benefits. The guarantee is not as large, but the risk of a taxpayer bailout
would be greatly lessened. In the operations of the PBGC, there must be a tradeoff of
effectiveness for efficiency. In order for the PBGC to be totally effective, they must
guarantee all pension benefits. In order to be efficient, they must charges sufficient,
uncapped premiums based solely on the risk presented to the PBGC. By trying to operate
in the middle, with risk-adjusted premiums, they still have the adverse selection and
behavioral distortion problems.
We now move to the asset / liability mismatch. The best available investment option
the PBGC could use that would fluctuate inversely with the assets of pension funds are
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derivatives. Unfortunately, the volatile nature of these vehicles are not consistent with
insurance. The PBGC could not afford major losses. Instead, they need to invest for long
term growth. Most agree that the best way to do so is through equity markets. Therefore,
the asset / liability mismatch is a risk for which the PBGC must charge. Unfortunately, we
have seen that higher premiums will only remove strong plans from the PBGC pool.
The main problem we see arising is that the PBGC is not and cannot operate as an
insurer should. The PBGC is designed so that they cannot diversify their risks. Most any
factor that would decrease the assets of an individual fund will do so for all funds. This
correlation of risks means the PBGC has only one option to continue to function. It must
build up funds through higher premiums and riskier investments in order to cushion itself for
potential liabilities. As we have seen, however, by doing so they will continue to lose
strong plans and distort the behavior of those that stay. Although these suggestions could
help to lessen the problem, the fundamental dilemmas still exist. The PBGC cannot
effectively and efficiently guarantee defined-benefit pension plans.
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VI. Supply and Demand Comparison

The two pages following show two separate comparisons of the supply and demad
changes that would occur with removal of the PBGC. In Comparison # 1, we see the effects
ofPBGC removal on a hospital and auto manufacturer, both with full-funded pension plans.
The demand curve shift in both is the same because both have the same premium amounts
removed, thereby reduced the marginal net revenue product. The supply curve for the auto
manufacturer would shift more because it is a more cyclical industry. The chances ifit
reducing pension fund contributions to help in a downturn is greater than the hospital's. For
this reason a larger default risk has been placed on the workers at the auto manufacturer. In
return, they will demand a greater compensation for this risk.
In Comparison #2, we see the same two industries, except with underfunded plans.
Here we will see a large shift in the demand curve, the same for both, as they have had a
large PBGC premium removed, thereby significantly reducing the marginal net revenue
product. Again we also see a larger shift in supply for the auto manufacturer for the same
reasons as above.
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Comparison # 1

Fully-funded hospital
Price
(Wages)

Sw/oPBGC
Sw/PBGC

Risk
Premium

Dw/oPBGC
Dw/PBGC

Quantity
(# of employees)

Fully-funded auto manufacturer
Price
(Wages)

Risk
Premium

Equilibrium Price
without PBGC

1
T

Equilibrium Price
withPBGC
Quantity
(# of employees)

Dw/oPBGC
Dw/PBGC

Comparison :# 2

Price
(Wages)

Underfunded hospital
Equilibrium Price
without PBGC

1

Sw/oPBGC
Sw/PBGC

Risk
Premium
Dw/oPBGC

Dw/PBGC

Quantity

(# of employees)

Underfunded auto Inanufacturer
Price
(Wages)

Equilibrium Price
without PBGC

1
Risk
Premium

Dw/PBGC

Quantity

(# of employees)
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